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ABSTRACT 
Paper explores the controversial relationship between Schelling and Hegel with respect to 
the role of negativity. By rejecting the common framework, according to which, one of the 
authors is usually presented as either advancing or preceding the other, it argues for an 
alternative synchronic reading which approaches this relationship not in terms of surpass-
ing, subordination or perversion but rather presents it as an inversion. By discussing (a) the 
negativity of reflection, (b) the ontological interpretation of the transcendental object and 
(c) the application of dialectics, it proposes an amphibolic elaboration of commonly shared 
presuppositions—a movement following a similar path yet in converse directions, which in 
its own turn challenges our common understanding of German idealism. 
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It is well known that any dialogue and friendship between Schelling and Hegel ended with their 
last letter exchange in 1807—the year when Hegel published his magnum opus, Phänomenologie des 
Geistes. Soon after some brief and bitter remarks about each other they chose different paths to pro-
ceed towards the system of the absolute. Schelling took the famous Hegel quote about “the night in 
which all cows are black” as an inadequate personal critique and kept relentlessly attacking Hegel’s 
own project long after his death. Hegel himself believed that Schelling stopped halfway by “educating 
himself in public” and hence making mistake after mistake. Looking from Hegel’s per ective, even the 
later Schelling’s emphasis on reason’s inability to ground itself, his elaboration of the concepts of Ungr-
und or umgekehrte Idee can be seen as seeking a “bad infinity” and thus rejecting the necessary dialectical 
unity of the finite and the absolute. But one could reverse the judgment and demonstrate the ways in 
which Hegel himself—as, in Schelling’s view, only the representative of negative philosophy, that is, ac-
counting only for the realm of the possible and not for the actual (wirklich) world—is indeed blind and 
therefore unable to admit thought’s dependence on that which is unprethinkable (das Unvordenkliche). 
Accordingly, this situation of apparent misunderstanding from both sides, this radical split concerning 
the limits of philosophy is the main problem which I am going to consider in this paper. How should 
we approach this incompatibility of Schelling’s and Hegel’s positions regarding the possibility and lim-
its of conceptual thinking as such? What potential does this ambivalent movement between them 
eventually disclose? 
According to the still prevailing narrative, which can be defined as a diachronic approach, one of 
the authors is usually presented as either advancing (cf. Houlgate, 1999; Rosen, 2013) or preceding 
the other (cf. Tritten, 2012; Freydberg, 2008; Matthews, 2007; Schulz, 1986). However, I attempt to 
show that insofar as it concerns the limits of reflection and their understanding of the negativity of 
Schelling vs. Hegel: Negativity in inversion
157Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 19(2):156-160, may/aug 2018
self-consciousness, this model appears to be insufficient. If one 
takes into account their emphasis on the necessity to bring the 
Kantian project of critical philosophy to its extremes in order 
to “save Kant from himself,” it becomes equally possible to justify 
Hegel’s and Schelling’s criticism towards each other. What Hegel 
sees as major misinterpretations of the absolute, negation or the 
concept in Schelling’s thought, the latter shows the same in He-
gel’s. The difficulty lies in the fact that even if they both approach 
the identity of thought and being from different angles, they both 
assume it, both ground reflection in  eculation and both pres-
ent the absolute as mediation itself. As soon as we accept that 
one surpasses the other, the former always appears in the shadow 
of the latter. Thus, in order to avoid applying such one-sided re-
ductive schemes that would “resolve” their incompatibility, I sug-
gest an alternative, that is, a synthetic view which approaches the 
Schelling-Hegel controversy (at least with re ect to the negativ-
ity of self-consciousness) not in terms of surpassing, subordination 
or perversion but rather presents it as an inversion. That is, if we 
reject the diachronic framework, we may see a possibility of an 
alternative explication of the aforementioned commonly shared 
presuppositions inherent in both Schelling and Hegel, which cre-
ate an inverse movement, following a similar path yet in converse 
directions. The narrower per ective from which I will approach 
this issue further in order to justify my argument is the role of 
negativity in the act of reflection. 
However, it should be noted that even if such an alterna-
tive view eventually indeed appears to be justified, it is not so 
much expected to provide some positive solution to this contro-
versy. It rather aims at giving us an opportunity to approach the 
Schelling-Hegel relationship from a different per ective and to 
modify the whole focus of the nature and the role of negativity 
in question. A similar path which presents Schelling and Hegel 
as further developing the Kantian project in different directions 
has also been sugge ed by insightful authors such as Christopher 
Lauer (2010) and Miklos Vetö (1998), yet the very ambiguity of 
their relationship, that is, the apparent impossibility to accept one 
position without simultaneously assuming or at least legitimating 
the other is not widely discussed. 
Thus, leaving aside the controversial transition from 
negative to positive philosophy or to the philosophy of revela-
tion in the late Schelling (cf. Garcia, 2011; Wirth, 2003), I am 
going to rely only on his concept of negative or rational phi-
losophy (and its limits) as such which he presents in his Mu-
nich or Berlin lectures. I will also focus on the mature Hegel 
who proudly presents his philosophy as negative par excellence. 
Accordingly, first going through (a) the negativity of reflection, 
then discussing (b) the ontological interpretation of the transcen-
dental object and finally (c) the application of dialectics, I intend 
to justify my proposal of an alternative.
I
Firstly, considering the negativity of reflection, which 
presents itself as the always mediated act of cognition dividing 
itself into subject and object, both Schelling and Hegel tend 
to radicalize Kant’s position. The only way to overcome the 
crisis of reason left behind by the dualism of Kant and Fichte 
was to push their discoveries to the extremes and to ques-
tion not only the forms of cognition but the very substance 
or what they call die Sache—the “absolute form” of thinking. 
Kant himself had already noticed that there is no possibility 
to grasp the transcendental subject as the source of reflection 
and determination. If in the act of reflection that which is the 
object is always presupposed by the subject and vice versa, we 
must also assume that the subject as subject always appears 
as something negated because in every reflection it is always 
transformed into an object. Consequently, the transcendental 
subject, understood as that which is unconditional and which 
grounds and provides the object its determinacy, is turned 
into its own phenomenon as soon as it attempts to grasp 
itself as it is in itself. That is, it can always be given only as 
something determinate or phenomenal and not as something 
that is unconditional. Every attempt to grasp a reflective act 
appears to be the product or result of reflection doubling its 
own structure. Thus, in order to avoid admitting that the act 
of reflection separates itself from itself and always remains 
outside itself, Kant suggests, we must presuppose the subject 
only as a function of thinking in the unity of apperception 
(Kant, 1998, p. A116-A120). Yet Schelling and Hegel were 
not satisfied with the merely regulative or formal description 
of reflection since it remained confined to the dualistic logic 
of subject-object, form-content etc. They realized the neces-
sity to open its ontological and  eculative horizons, which 
could account for the initial unity and separation of subject 
and object. Accordingly, the passage from the question of the 
transcendental subject to the question of the absolute subject 
concerned precisely the passage from reflection to  ecula-
tion. In this way the problem of the relationship between the 
finite and the infinite, freedom and necessity, subjectivity and 
objectivity turned into the question of how these distinctions 
were possible at all. 
It seems that Schelling, in particular, takes advantage 
of this impossibility to grasp the reflective act itself. Looking 
from his per ective, this impossibility can also be conceived 
as its only possibility or confirmation. For if true self-reflec-
tion would somehow be possible, that is, if it could indeed be 
determined as such, it would inevitably only become its own 
projection or result. And if it is not possible, then this indeter-
minacy or negativity which lies within reason’s permanent ef-
fort to ground itself eventually posits thinking in a never-end-
ing and open process of self-overcoming. It is a permanent 
striving to destroy mediation which simultaneously creates or 
produces it. According to Schelling,
we could use the term ecstasy for this re-
lation. Our ego, namely, is placed outside 
itself, i.e. outside its role. Its role is to be 
subject. Confronted with the absolute sub-
ject, it cannot remain a subject, for the ab-
solute subject cannot behave like an object. 
It must, then, give up its place, it must be 
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placed outside itself, as something that no 
longer exists (Schelling, 1997, p. 228).
Therefore, following this view, the reflective act itself 
can be conceived as a kind of ecstatic nothingness which is not 
just simply nothingness but is ontologically rooted nothing-
ness, as a no-thing, a potential void or Plato’s χώρα in which 
something can appear at all. It seems that this paradoxical 
openness of thought to the world arising from its inability to 
ground itself becomes the core axis of Schelling’s philosophy 
of freedom and ontology (or rather topology) of nothingness, 
which he first elaborates through the concept of Ungrund in 
his Freiheit essay in 1809 and which in particular distinguishes 
him from Hegel. 
Hegel, on the other hand, elaborates this insight by re-
versing the crucial tensions: if, strictly  eaking, the source of 
reflection cannot be given directly and without any media-
tion, then this, according to him, does not necessarily signi-
fy that no ultimate self-reflection and absolute knowledge is 
impossible. That would eventually lead us to the dead ends of 
skepticism. Rather, it can reveal the fact that mediation is ex-
actly the way through which consciousness is given its  ecu-
lative content. And if so, then the capacity to conceive and 
grasp this fact leads us to the recognition that this “inequality 
lies within consciousness itself ” (die Ungleichheit im Bewußt-
sein). In the Science of Logic Hegel claims: 
Reflection is at first the movement of the 
nothing to the nothing, and thus negation 
coinciding with itself (die Bewegung des 
Nichts zu Nichts) and therefore back to it-
self (mit sich selbst zusammengehende). [...] 
it is the negative of itself: its being is to be 
what it is not (das Negative ihrer selbst ist, 
dies zu sein, was sie nicht ist) (Hegel, 2010, 
p. 346).
This complicated but very important remark presents 
mediation as that which is itself immediate and which has to 
be so in order to be gra ed. Yet at the moment of its reflec-
tion, this immediacy is negated again and with this double 
move the immediacy of negation becomes necessarily presup-
posed (vorausgesetzt). In other words, it means that reflection 
can only determine itself as negation but being determined is 
already being negated and that is how thought, according to 
Hegel, actualizes or performs that which is negative in nega-
tion itself. 
Thus, if we agree that both Hegel and Schelling approach 
the negativity of self-consciousness within the  eculative, 
we can also admit that the former does it by recognizing 
the all-encompassing mediation lying within reflection, the 
“movement from nothing to nothing”, while the latter pres-
ents this void as a permanent state of being outside or being 
the other, always determining that which is indeterminate. 
It can be interpreted as the inversion of thought’s teleology: 
even if both Schelling and Hegel admit the immanence of rea-
son and the impossibility to reach “beyond” thinking, Schell-
ing presents it as a major structural lack and finitude of ra-
tional thought. Hegel, on the contrary, moves in the opposite 
direction: if the negativity of self-consciousness presents itself 
as a permanent self-negation and always seeks to overcome 
itself, then this is exactly the way how it affirms and returns 
to itself that which was negated. Therefore, either there is no 
outer that would not simultaneously be the inner as it is for 
Hegel, or there is no inner which is immediately not the outer, 
which appears to be the case in Schelling. 
II
Similarly, the ontological interpretation of Kant’s idea 
of the transcendental object which is present in the works 
of both thinkers leads to ambiguous interpretations. The in-
evitable necessity to reject the merely formal or descriptive 
(instead of constituting) a ect of knowledge allowed them 
to ree ablish the lost identity of thought and being. Hegel 
justified it by emphasizing the performativity and dynamics of 
the concept as such. By bringing it back to its origin in the 
German verb greifen as it appears in the word “concept” as 
Be-griff, he aimed to show that the structure of reason or, to 
be more precise, the negative movement of determinations 
constitutes the very structure of being, whereas for Schelling, 
conversely, the proposed identity of thought and being relies 
on the emphasis on concept’s potentiality. That is, by relying 
on the insight into thought’s amphibolism (alluding to Kant), 
Schelling argues for the asymmetrical relationship between 
being and the concept of being and thus limits rationality 
only to the sphere of permanent potentiality (or what he calls 
das unendliche Seynkönnen [Schelling, 2007, p. 133]). In other 
words, the concept of being coincides with but never exhausts 
being as such. 
This tension implies their different understanding of the 
genesis of the concept. Hegel conceives it as a particular move 
(and not only a kind of subject’s capacity to attach words to 
things), whereas for Schelling this “move” is something that 
has already become concept in the act of reflection. Accord-
ing to him, philosophy always starts from not-knowing, from 
the experience of lack and insufficiency. It seeks that which 
from the primal state of not-knowing appears to be transcen-
dent, it seeks to know reality and being as such and not only 
its deduced concepts. In his Munich lectures on the histo-
ry of modern philosophy Schelling claims: “What is first of 
all in question is: What is. How, therefore, could that from 
which one begins already be in existence itself (selbst schon 
seyend seyn) is supposed first to be found?” (Schelling, 1994, 
p. 154). Thus, according to Schelling, reason primordially 
finds in itself that which is not and cannot be identical with 
the concept and which due to its irreducibility reveals itself 
as its moving force. In other words, negative or rational phi-
losophy can only produce the concept of being as its final telos. 
Yet if Schelling understands concept only as a potency of be-
ing which reveals its inequality to actual being, Hegel, on the 
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contrary, locates this inequality within the concept itself and 
defines it as its auto-poietic nature. It follows then that, taken 
in this sense, negative philosophy is no longer only the nega-
tive here (as in the case of Schelling) because exactly by being 
negative, philosophy, according to Hegel, can absorb every-
thing: possibility, becoming and reality are only the different 
moments of the same thought’s development. In his Science of 
Logic Hegel writes: “As science, truth is pure self-conscious-
ness as it develops itself and has the shape of the self, so that 
that which exists in and for itself is the conscious concept and 
the concept as such is that which exists in and for itself ” (He-
gel, 2010, p. 29). Thus, even if both Schelling and Hegel agree 
that the concept is born from the negative relation e ablished 
in the reflective act, for Schelling, the concept understood as 
essence (the “what” or “was” of the thing) ex definitio cannot 
be identical or coincide with the relation itself. That relation 
is only the possibility of its actuality and not of its  ecific es-
sence given a priori. 
The basis for this mutual confusion may also lie in the 
fact that Schelling and Hegel use one and the same German 
term, “übergehen,” in different senses. For both of them the 
process of the concept “going over” into the actual is of cru-
cial importance. Yet what separates them is the very direction 
and quality of this “übergehen.” Existence for Hegel is only the 
development of the concept’s self-referential identity and me-
diated immediacy which is reached in the self-negation of the 
reflective act or in the already mentioned split (Teilung) and 
twofoldness of reflection. It follows then that this approach 
towards existence considers not existence as such but only the 
way how it reveals or becomes possible in the concept and 
as its development. Taken in this sense, any question about 
the existence that could be somehow external to the concept 
simply becomes meaningless because existence here is only 
the derivative of the concept. Thus, unlike the case of Schell-
ing, where existence appears to be prior to the concept and 
is what he calls an inverted idea (umgekehrte Idee), where the 
concept itself is conceived only as the passive result of cogni-
tion, in Hegel’s case existence is presented as the dynamic na-
ture of the conceptual itself. Concept (as Begriff) for him ap-
pears to be the retaining, “seizing” or “grasping” power which 
is also the primal separation—Teilung, if we remember how 
accurately the concept of Urteil was explained by Friedrich 
Hölderlin already in 1794 (Hölderlin, 1991). Therefore, He-
gel justifies his idea by emphasizing the performative, whereas 
Schelling stresses only the potential a ect of the concept. One 
sees the concept as the very dynamics of mediation, while the 
other always sees it as its delayed result, only as the passive 
possibility to be.
III
The situation is similar in the case of dialectics: by for-
mulating and accepting the principle of identity within dif-
ference, both authors reintroduce Kant’s transcendental di-
alectics in terms of  eculative logic, which plays an essential 
role in the whole movement of their thought. However, the 
dialectical su ension of pure identity or pure difference in 
both authors also eventually appear to direct them in con-
verse directions. 
According to Schelling, real dialectics takes place not 
only in thinking but rather between thinking and that which, 
as the very process of thought’s actualization, always escapes 
its immanent determinations and is left beyond. Again, it is 
the negative power which enables and sustains thought’s con-
tinuity. Already in The Ages of the World Schelling admits that 
the very existence and necessity of dialectics only signifies the 
fact that dialectics itself is far from “actual knowledge” (wirkli-
che Wissenschaft) (Schelling, 2000, p. xxxvii). Since the dialec-
tical process posits and at the same time dissolves any positive 
knowledge, it eventually signifies the insufficiency of logic 
and one-sided rationality. Thus, Schelling sees the necessity 
for the dialectics of dialectics, which means that reason must 
presuppose the negativity of itself in toto. 
Hegel, as we saw, on the contrary, argues that any dif-
ference already anticipates a common identity and directs 
everything towards absolute knowledge and immanence. 
Schelling, although following the same structure of this thesis, 
applies the inverse logic. Difference rather than identity here 
comes as the generating force which grounds the possibility of 
identity. Of course, Hegel does not argue for the contrary but 
what separates them is the direction of the elaboration of this 
principle and the problem which is at stake. One questions 
the differential nature of difference and finally claims for ab-
solute identity as reason’s terminus ad quem, while the other 
sees the necessity to admit the primordiality of difference and 
rejects the possibility of any final synthesis. Thus, either we 
have a closed circle and absolute knowledge, or an open and 
never-ending process of separation. It depends on the focus: 
looking from Hegel’s per ective, Schelling’s alternative only 
confirms the totality of discursive thinking. That is, even if 
we accept the idea of radical reason’s otherness to what is ac-
tual and thus remains always more or less but never equal to 
what is conceptual, the very possibility of grasping this idea 
can be interpreted in the Hegelian manner as the capacity of 
dialectical reason to embrace within itself the whole totality 
(Ganze). Yet equally looking from Schelling’s per ective, we 
can assume that the supposed totality of Hegel’s  eculative 
logic, its magic power to internalize everything external, ac-
tually does not internalize anything at all. On the contrary, it 
may be seen as only negatively revealing or presupposing that 
which necessarily remains indeterminable and irreducible to 
conceptual thought. In the words of Schelling himself, this 
supposed Hegelian all-encompassing totality is only the “ag-
ony of the concept.” Yet for Hegel this agony reveals itself as 
a sacrifice, as what he famously calls the “Bacchanalian revel.” 
It is the process of initiation which eventually resurrects all 
reality and returns it to the concept as the absolute itself. This 
inner dialectical movement of the concept for Hegel explains 
its relationship with what can be defined as a pre-conceptual 
or objective reality. But Schelling conceives this agony almost 
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literally, as the fall (Abfall) of the concept, when he claims 
that “in nature the concept is supposed to be stripped of its 
splendor, powerless, to have become untrue to itself, and inca-
pable of sustaining itself any more” (Schelling, 1994, p. 154).
For Hegel, who relies on the idea of the concept’s exterior-
ization (Entäußerung), i.e. being the other while always remain-
ing itself, thought appears as always inevitably directed towards 
identity and final synthesis. It presents identity as something 
to be returned to as an eternal past or permanent beginning. 
Schelling, conversely, always emphasizes the primal difference 
(Urzwist), the moving force which always leaves thinking open 
and directed towards the future of the absolute Unprethinkabil-
ity (Unvordenklichkeit). Therefore, we have the reverse move-
ment of the same circle again: it either is the heteronomous 
identity or the identical heteronomy.
Conclusion
I attempted to show how the sugge ed mirror play be-
tween Schelling and Hegel could help us modify the whole 
focus of their controversy. The central issue here would no 
longer be the question of overcoming or subordination but 
rather the question of how the coexistence of these two dif-
ferent but equally legitimate approaches towards negativity 
can be possible at all. If, as it was argued, Schelling can in-
deed be read as an inverted Hegel, or Hegel as an inverted 
Schelling, we may ask further: is it possible to think about 
another form of mirroring effect which is implicit in their very 
relationship and yet totally different from the understanding 
of dialectics provided by each of them separately? Or should 
we rather admit that by fulfilling itself in these two extremes 
German idealism had already reached its limits and requires 
a movement beyond itself ? In any case, there is no doubt that 
its “pendulum of the negative” still haunts and challenges our 
thinking with its own, to borrow Schelling’s metaphor, “eter-
nal Magic.”
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